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Ellen D. Katz*

The Shelby County Problem
INTRODUCTION
Decided on June 23, 2013, Shelby County v. Holder scrapped the
coverage formula set forth in Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act (VRA).
Congress first enacted this formula in 1965 and, in it, set forth criteria to
identify places with low levels of voter participation that was likely
attributable to racial discrimination. Once identified, "covered"
jurisdictions needed to obtain federal approval, known as preclearance,
before changing any electoral practice. Specifically, they needed to
demonstrate to the U.S. Department of Justice or a federal court that
proposed changes were not discriminatory in purpose or effect. 1 Shelby
County lifted the preclearance requirement by tossing out the 4(b) criteria
that had subjected jurisdictions to it. 2
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice John Roberts explained that
the coverage formula had once "made sense" but that "[n]early 50 years
later, things have changed dramatically" such that the formula no longer
"speaks to current conditions." 3 In dissent, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
countered that improved conditions in covered jurisdictions were
dependent on the statute's continued operation. She wrote, "Throwing out
preclearance when it has worked and is continuing to work to stop
discriminatory changes is like throwing away your umbrella in a
rainstorm because you are not getting wet." 4
The preclearance requirement Shelby County immobilized was, as
the Chief Justice noted repeatedly, "extraordinary." 5 Applicable in some
parts of the country but not others, preclearance reversed the ordinary
presumption that state and local action is legitimate absent proof to the
contrary. Designed to "shift the advantage of time and inertia from the
* Ralph W. Aigler Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. Thanks to
the participants at the Election Law Stories roundtable at Moritz College of Law for helpful
comments and suggestions. Thanks also Daniel Osher for excellent research assistance, and
to the University of Michigan Law School, which provided generous financial support for
this project through the Cook Endowment.
52 U.S.C. § 10303 (formerly 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b)).
116 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
a Id. at 2625, 2631.
4
Id. at 2650 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
116 S. Ct. at 2619, 2624-2626, 2628, 2630, 2631.
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perpetrators of evil to its victims," the requirement blocked
implementation of electoral changes unless and until covered
jurisdictions could prove the changes would be nondiscriminatory. 6
The fact that the preclearance obligation existed in some places but
not others had once been thought to contribute to the regime's
constitutionality. 7 With time, however, this regional selectivity became
the regime's primary vulnerability. 8 A growing number of critics insisted
that public officials in covered jurisdictions were no more likely to engage
in discriminatory practices than officials elsewhere, and thus requiring
them to obtain preclearance before changing electoral rules was not only
burdensome but unfair. 9

Shelby County ended this regional variation by invalidating the
coverage formula and thereby rendering preclearance inoperative.
Within hours of the decision, once-covered jurisdictions began
implementing new electoral rules that the preclearance requirement
had-or would have-blocked. 10 Shelby County left Congress with less
power to protect voting rights by narrowing the range of discriminatory
conduct entitled to congressional remedy. The decision suggests that the
Court, not Congress, will henceforth judge how racial discrimination in
voting should be remedied.
This chapter tells the story of Shelby County v. Holder. Part I locates
its origin long before the 2013 ruling. It describes Congress's first efforts
to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court's response to
those efforts, and the consequences that followed. Part II examines
Congress's 1965 decision to craft the formula Shelby County scrapped; it
describes the core provisions of the VRA as originally enacted, the initial
amendments to it, and pivotal judicial interpretations of these provisions
prior to 2006. Part III looks at the 2006 reauthorization of the VRA and
the emergence of what the chapter will refer to as the Shelby County
problem, namely, the difficulty for Congress to justify the maintenance or
re-enactment of an existing remedy for constitutional violations as a
proper exercise of its enforcement powers under the Reconstruction-era
Amendments to the Constitution. Part III also describes how the Court
handled that problem in the litigation leading up to Shelby County. Part
IV describes the Shelby County litigation, including both lower court
rulings and the Supreme Court's decision. Part V examines the decision's
impact and implications.

6
7
8

9
10

See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 327-328, 335 (1966).
See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532-33 (1997).
See Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2623--24, 2628--31.
See infra notes 88--89 and accompanying text.
See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
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I.

Enforcement-and Non-Enforcement-of
Amendment Before the Voting Rights Act

the

Fifteenth

Ratified in 1870, the Fifteenth Amendment provides that "[t]he right
of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by
the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude." 11 Section 2 of the Amendment vests Congress
with the power to enforce its substantive guarantee ''by appropriate
legislation." 12
Congress quickly invoked the enforcement power the new
amendment provided and enacted three statutes designed to address the
violence and resistance African-American voters were increasingly
confronting in the former Confederacy. 13 The Enforcement Act of 1870
stated that citizens "otherwise qualified by law to vote ... shall be
entitled and allowed to vote . . . without distinction of race, color or
previous condition of servitude." 14 The 1870 Act set forth various
penalties for public and private conduct that interfered with voting, and
two acts that Congress passed the following year provided additional
penalties and improved enforcement mechanisms. 15
Congress's power to craft these measures was soon challenged.
United States v. Reese arose after an African-American man named
William Garner was unable to vote in a municipal election in Lexington,
Kentucky, on January 31, 1873. State law required voters to pay a poll
tax in advance of the election. Garner had tried to do so, but the city tax
collector had refused to accept payment "on account of the race and color
of Garner." On Election Day, Garner attempted to vote by presenting an
affidavit attesting to his efforts to pay the tax. Hiram Reese and Matthew
Foushee were election inspectors who, over the dissent of a colleague,
refused to let Garner vote. 16
Federal indictments followed that charged Reese and Foushee with
violating Sections 3 and 4 of the 1870 Act. Section 3 said a voter's "offer"
to satisfy a prerequisite to voting should be treated as "performance in
law of such act," an election official wrongfully prevent the offer from
being "carried into execution." Section 4 made it a criminal offense
"wrongfully [to] refuse or omit to receive ... the vote of such citizen," or
to prevent a citizen "from doing any act required to be done" to "qualify
him to vote or from voting at an election as aforesaid." 17

U.S. Const. amend. 15, § 1.
Id.§ 2.
13
See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 84 (2009).
14
Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140-41, repealed by 28 Stat. 36, 37 (1894).
15
Id.; Enforcement Act of 1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433 (1871); Enforcement Act of 1871,
ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
16
92 U.S. 214, 216 (1875); id. at 238--39 (Hunt, J. dissenting).
17
Act of May 31, 1870, §§ 3, 4.
11

12
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Reese and Foushee challenged the indictments, maintaining that
Sections 3 and 4 of the 1870 Act were not "appropriate legislation"
enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court agreed. Chief
Justice Waite's majority opinion observed that "Congress can interfere"
in state elections only when a state "wrongful[ly] refus[es] to receive the
vote of a qualified elector ... because of race, color, or previous condition
of servitude." The Chief Justice read Sections 3 and 4 to reach beyond
such race-based denials to encompass wrongful denials of the vote more
generally. He wrote that Section 3 "does not in express terms limit the
offense ... to a wrongful discrimination on account of race," and that
Section 4 similarly contained "no words of limitation, or reference even,
that can be constructed as manifesting any intention to confine its
provisions to the terms of the Fifteenth Amendment." 18
There were better ways to read these statutory provisions. The first
Section of the 1870 Act explicitly recognized the racial component the
Chief Justice said was missing, specifying that qualified citizens must be
allowed to vote "without distinction of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude." Sections 3 and 4 described statutory offenses based on the
wrongful conduct "aforesaid." 19 Congress, moreover, had enacted these
provisions to address the race-based violence and discrimination AfricanAmerican voters were confronting in the South on account of their race, 20
and there was no dispute that the defendants themselves had prevented
a man from voting based on a "distinction of race."
Reese nevertheless opted to read the statute uncharitably, refusing
to accord it the meaning Congress intended, or at least to allow its
application to circumstances that were indisputably within Congress's
power to regulate. Congress, to be sure, could have cured the legal
deficiency Reese identified with simple drafting change, given that the
decision's stingy statutory interpretation left Congress's power to enforce
the Fifteenth Amendment intact. 21 But Reese came at a moment when
18
Reese, 92 U.S. at 218, 220. Reese was decided the same day as United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875), which identified a legal error analogous to the one in Reese
but found in federal indictments rather than in a statute. The indictments charged, inter
alia, the defendants with having attacked their victims because they had voted and thus in
violation of Section 6 of the 1870 Act. See Act of May 31, 1870, chapter 114, § 6, 16 Stat.
140---41 (prohibiting interference with the "free exercise and enjoyment of any right or
privilege granted or secured ... by the Constitution or laws of the United States").
Cruikshank dismissed this charge because the Court thought the indictments failed
adequately to allege that the defendants had acted because of their victims' race.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 556 ("We may suspect that race was the cause of the hostility," but
this racial intent "is not so averred.").
19
Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, §§ 1, 3, 4, 16 Stat. 140-41, repealed by 28 Stat. 36,
37 (1894).
20
See Reese, 92 U.S. at 241 (Hunt, J, dissenting); Cong. Globe, 41st Cong, 2d Sess.
3663 (1870) (remarks of Senator Sherman); CHARLES FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND
REUNION, 1864-1888, at 231, 235 n.55, 250, 278 (1987).
21
See Ellen D. Katz, Reinforcing Representation: Congressional Power to Enforce the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments in the Rehnquist and Waite Courts, 101 MICH. L.
REV. 2357-2358 (2003). For a similar argument, see PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RETHINKING THE
JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF RECONSTRUCTION (2013).
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political support for federal intervention in the South was waning and
Congress opted against making the change Reese required. 22
Following Republican congressional victories in 1888, a new bill was
introduced in Congress to revive the Enforcement Acts and expand
federal power to supervise elections, guard against fraud and
intimidation, and remedy violations. But this bill died in the Senate in
1891 as competing priorities divided and distracted its Republican
supporters. 23
Meanwhile, the former Confederate states had begun holding
constitutional conventions and referenda deliberately crafted to prevent
African-Americans from voting. The principal goal of these efforts was to
entrench white supremacy, as their supporters proudly announced. 24 In
the years that followed, scores of onerous and deceptive hurdles were
erected to block African-American voters and a host of poor white voters
from registering and casting ballots.
Both Congress and the Court responded with remarkable
indifference. For a time, the Committee on Elections within the House of
Representatives continued to review disputed congressional elections
marked by violence, fraud, or discriminatory practices. But these efforts
were short-lived25 and Congress as a whole showed little interest in
resisting the disenfranchisement project under way in the Southern
states. In 1894, Congress voted to repeal substantial portions of the 1870
and 1871 Acts. 26
By 1903, the Court scrapped one of the few provisions of the 1870
Act that had survived. The provision at issue established criminal
penalties for "any person" who, through bribery or threats, hindered the
exercise of voting rights as guaranteed by the Fifteenth Amendment. 27
James v. Bowman 28 held that Congress could not reach purely private
action when enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment. 29
22
Michael Les Benedict, Preserving Federalism: Reconstruction and the Waite
Court, 1978 SUPREME COURT REVIEW 39, 73 (1979); DAVID CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN
THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 402 (1985) 402; Fairman, supra note 20,

at 278.
23
See XI WANG, THE TRIAL OF DEMOCRACY: BLACK SUFFRAGE AND NORTHERN
REPUBLICANS, 1860-1910, at 250-251 (1997); R. Welch Jr., The Federal Elections Bill of
1890: Postscripts and Prelude, 52 J. OF AM. HIST. 511, 511 (1965).
24
Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985); Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528
(1965); see also Richard Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, 17 CONST.
COMM. 295, 301-302 (2000).
25
See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA s. KARLAN & RICHARD H. PILDES, THE LAW OF
DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS (4th ed. 2012), at 103.
26
WANG, supra note 23, at 254-259.
27
Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 5, 16 Stat. 140-41.
28
190 U.S. 127, 139 (1903). The Court also held that the indictments failed
adequately to ascribe a racial motivation for the conduct charged.
29
Id. at 140. James v. Bowman did not question Congress's power to proscribe
bribery in federal elections, the absence of state action notwithstanding. But while the
election in dispute was, in fact, a congressional election, the statute itself referenced the
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At the same time, the Court turned back a Fifteenth Amendment
challenge to new registration requirements mandated by the 1901
Alabama Constitution. Giles v. Harris never questioned the allegation
that black men who attempted to register under the new system "[were]
refused arbitrarily on the ground of [their] color ... while all white men
were registered." 30 The Court nevertheless insisted that it had no power
to grant meaningful relief, largely because it was convinced that it would
do no good. According to Justice Holmes, insofar as "the great mass of the
white population intends to keep the blacks from voting ... a name on a
piece of paper will not defeat them." 31
The year after Giles, the House Committee on Elections announced
it was withdrawing from adjudicating congressional election disputes.
The Committee explained that to declare a victor "not elected" because of
"the disfranchisement of the colored vote" would be "precedent for
unseating nearly every member of the House" from the former
Confederate states. 32 Congress followed up in 1909 and again in 1911, by
repealing all but three of the remaining sections of the 1870 and 1871
Enforcement Acts. 33
The result was a diminished electorate. Coupled with more modest
and segmented franchise restrictions in the North and West, 34 this newly
constrained population of voters ensured Congress would remain
indifferent to disenfranchisement for decades. Fueling this indifference
was ever-worsening malapportionment and the Court's insistence that
this problem was nonjusticiable. 35 Nor did the Justices help matters
when, in 1937, they voted to uphold the poll tax against Fourteenth and
Nineteenth Amendment challenges. 36 Due largely to southern opposition,
proposals for Congress to outlaw the poll tax in federal elections made
little progress. 37
Fifteenth Amendment as the source under which Congress had acted. The Court insisted it
was unable to limit the statute to federal elections, and thus allow it to serve another
purpose from the one for which it was enacted.
30
Giles v. Harris, 189 US 475,482 (1903).
31
Id. at 488. The Court also professed an inability both to invalidate the regime and
order Giles registered under a "void instrument." Id. at 486.
32
R.R. REP. No 1740, at 3 (1904); ISSACHAROFF, ET AL, supra note 25, at 103.
33
WANG, supra note 23, at 259. Sections 1, 6, and 17 of the 1870 Act remained
standing.
34
KEYSSAR, supra note 13, at 136-138; W.D. Burnham, The Changing Shape of the
American Political Universe, 59 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 7, 7-28 (1965).
36
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946). For a discussion of the Court's approach
to apportionment, see Guy Charles and Luis Fuentes-Rowher's chapter on Reynolds u. Sims
in this book.
36
Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937). For a discussion of the poll tax, see
Franita Tolson's chapter on Harper u. Virginia State Board of Elections in this book.
37 A limited exception was the Soldiers Voting Acts of 1942 and 1944, which
permitted absentee soldiers serving on military bases and abroad to register and vote
without paying local poll taxes. For a discussion, see KEYSSAR, supra note 13, at 197
(describing exemption as an "important step" in bringing down the poll tax in that the
"federal government's disapproval of poll taxes had become a matter of law").
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Still, the Court periodically invoked the Fifteenth Amendment
directly to displace discriminatory voting measures. It struck down
Oklahoma's notorious Grandfather Clause, and the invidious
replacement the State concocted for it, as blatant violations of the
Fifteenth Amendment. 38 The Court also held that later iterations of
Texas's infamous white primary were incompatible with the Fifteenth
Amendment, and, in 1944 and again in 1953, invalidated variations on
the practice. 39 The Court read the Fifteenth Amendment to bar an
Alabama gerrymander that removed almost every African-American
resident from the city of Tuskegee. 40 These decisions provided some relief,
and African-American voter registration, particularly in cities, climbed
slowly in their wake. 41
For its part, Congress took no action to enforce the Fifteenth
Amendment until after Brown v. Board of Education 42 in 1954 and the
Montgomery Bus boycott of 1955-1956. The Civil Rights Act of 1957, the
first federal civil rights law since 1875, empowered the Attorney General
to seek injunctive relief when enforcing voting rights, expanded the
ability of federal courts to hear such actions, and made changes within
the Justice Department that allowed for the creation of the Civil Rights
Division. 43 The Civil Rights Act of 1960 added record-keeping
requirements that increased federal power to inspect and monitor
registration practices, and thus brought discriminatory practices into
better view. 44
Time-consuming lawsuits followed that yielded hard-fought victories
but little concrete progress on the ground. State and local officials
replaced invalidated electoral practices with new discriminatory
measures that required more litigation to displace. The 1964 Civil Rights
Act outlawed racial discrimination in public accommodations,
employment and other arenas, but African-American voters in the South
continued to confront significant obstacles when they attempted to
register and vote. 45 In March 1965, televised protests in Selma, Alabama,
captured the depth of Southern resistance to ending race-based
disenfranchisement, 46 and prompted President Johnson to call on
Congress to enact a new voting law. 47

Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
40
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S 339 (1960).
41
See Michael J. Klarman, The White Primary Rulings: A Case Study in the
Consequences of Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 55 (2001).
42
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
43
Pub. L. No 85-315, 71 Stat. 637 (1957).
44
Pub. L. No 86-449, § 301, 74 Stat. 90 (1960).
45
See, e.g., S. Rep No. 109-295, at 11-12 (2006).
46
KEYSSAR, supra note 13, at 210-11.
47
Id. at 211.
38
39
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II. The Voting Rights Act and Its Interpretation Before 2006
During the spring of 1965, Congressional House and Senate
committees assembled what the Court would soon characterize as a
"voluminous" 48 record documenting persistent racial discrimination
against black voters in the South and the insufficiency of existing legal
tools to address it. The findings showed discriminatory administration of
voting qualifications, in which African-American applicants were
subjected to arbitrary and onerous requirements, while white applicants
were held to lower standards, admitted despite errors, or exempted from
the qualifications entirely. 49 Voting requirements were often
intentionally vague, thereby inviting abuse by local officials, or crafted to
create barriers, like obtaining vouchers from registered voters, that black
applicants would be unable to satisfy. Meanwhile, aggressive
enforcement of existing federal legislation to address these circumstances
had secured only marginal increases in black voter registration in places
like Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi. 5 0
Both the House and Senate held lengthy floor debates on this
evidence and the bill drafted to address it. Both voted, by large margins,
in favor of the new legislation. 51 President Johnson signed the bill into
law on August 6, 1965, and described it as a "triumph for freedom as huge
as any victory that has ever been won on any battlefield." 52
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 established intrusive requirements
designed to secure African -American access to the ballot. 53 Section 4(b)
designated jurisdictions "covered" if they used a "test or device" to limit
registration or voting, and less than half the jurisdiction's eligible citizens
were either registered to vote on November 1, 1964, or actually cast
ballots in the presidential election that year. 54 Section 4(a) prohibited
jurisdictions covered under 4(b) from denying the right to vote to any
person who failed to comply with a test or device. Section 5 barred these
jurisdictions from implementing any electoral change until either the
Attorney General or a federal district court in Washington, D.C. agreed
that the changes would be nondiscriminatory. 55
South Carolina, one of seven States originally covered by the 4(b)
formula, brought suit in which it challenged Congress's power to impose
the new requirements. South Carolina argued that the preclearance
48

South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309 (1966).
See H.R.Rep. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 8-16; S.Rep. No. 162, pt. 3, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess., 3-16.
50
See 383 U.S. at 313.
61
See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 309 (noting that the House
approved the bill by a vote of 328--74, and the Senate by 79-18).
52
See President Lyndon B. Johnson's Remarks in the Capitol Rotunda at the
Signing of the Voting Rights Act, August 6, 1965, at http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/
johnson/archives.hom/speeches.hom/650806.asp.
53
52 U.S.C. § 10303 (formerly 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b)).
49

54
55

Id.
Id.
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regime constituted an "unjustified" and "arbitrary" affront to the
"Equality of Statehood," and a "usurp[ation]" of the State's legislative and
executive functions. 56
The Supreme Court disagreed. In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, it
recognized extensive congressional power to craft "inventive" remedies to
address systematic racial discrimination in voting. The 4(b) coverage
formula was "rational in both practice and theory," capturing the places
where "Congress was ... entitled to infer a significant danger of ... evil."
Section 4(a)'s suspension of the use of tests and devices was a "legitimate
response" to their discriminatory use. The Section 5 preclearance
requirement was justified because Congress "had reason to suppose" that
preclearance was needed to block evasive, discriminatory moves. Based
on the record before it, Congress could lawfully choose to "shift the
advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of evil to its
victims." 57 Justice Black dissented alone, arguing that preclearance
impermissibly rendered covered States "little more than conquered
provinces." 58

South Carolina v. Katzenbach addressed Congress's power to enforce
the Fifteenth Amendment, but the Court soon made clear that Congress
enjoyed similarly expansive power to protect voting rights and civil rights
generally under the Fourteenth Amendment. Katzenbach v. Morgan
recognized this power when it turned back a constitutional challenge to
Section 4(e) of the VRA, which barred States from using English literacy as
a prerequisite to voting for graduates of designated non-Englishlanguage schools. 59 Unlike the provisions upheld in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, Section 4(e) was a late addition to the statute and lacked a
supporting evidentiary record documenting the problem it purported to
address. The provision, moreover, did not target a practice in the Jim
Crow South but instead the way in which New York's English literacy
requirement functioned to disenfranchise large segments of New York
City's Puerto Rican community. 60
Despite these differences, Katzenbach v. Morgan upheld Congress's
power to enact Section 4(e). Requiring neither concrete evidence nor
specific congressional findings of any sort, the Court deemed it sufficient
that Congress "might well have questioned" the facially neutral
justifications the State proffered for its literacy requirements, and that
the Court could "perceive a basis upon which the Congress might resolve
the conflict as it did." The Court observed that Congress might have
concluded both that New York's requirement itself constituted "invidious
discrimination in establishing voter qualifications," and that it fostered
56
Brief for Plaintiff at 4-5, South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (No
22), 1965 WL 130083, at *4-5.
57
303 U.S. 301, 327-29, 335 (1966).
58
Id. at 360 (Black, J., dissenting).
59
See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966).
60
52 U.S.C.A. § 10303(e) (formerly 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e)).
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"discrimination in governmental services." The Court in Morgan stated:
"It is not for us to review the congressional resolution" of the factors that
informed that judgment. The decision thus endorsed vast congressional
power to enforce the amendment, and, arguably, to interpret the scope of
the rights it protected as well. 61
As originally enacted, the preclearance mechanism of the VRA was slated to
expire after five years, but Congress repeatedly voted to extend the regime.
Reauthorizations in 1970 and again in 1975 updated the Section 4(b) coverage
formula to include voter participation data from elections in 1968 and
1972, respectively. 62 Congress also voted to suspend literacy tests
nationwide, first for five years, and then permanently. It also added
significant new protections for members of designated language minority
groups. 63
The Court upheld Congress's power to extend the statute in these
ways. In Oregon v. Mitchell, 64 Justice Black wrote that the nationwide
ban on literacy tests was constitutional because Congress "could have
concluded" that discrimination in education leaves some voters less
equipped than others to pass the tests. Justice Brennan likewise saw a
basis "upon which Congress could have" found that literacy tests have
discriminatory effects due to past discrimination in education. Justice
Stewart preferred the national ban on literary tests to the regionallyselective one it supplanted; he deemed the new measure "reasonable" and
"appropriate" legislation, and saw no need for evidence showing that the
tests "unfairly burden[]" minority voters or "state-by-state findings" of
any sort. After all, "Congress may paint with a much broader brush than
may this Court."65
In 1980, the Court again upheld the constitutionality of the VRA as
reauthorized in 1975, albeit now in a divided decision. City of Rome v.
United States arose when city officials challenged a denial of preclearance
made pursuant to the 1975 reauthorization; they argued, inter alia, that
Congress lacked power to ban implementation of electoral practices that
were discriminatory only in effect. 66 Mobile v. Bolden, decided the same
day as City of Rome, made clear that public conduct does not violate the
Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments simply because it has a racially
disproportionate impact. 67 City of Rome held that Congress could
Id. at 653-655, 657.
Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314, 315;
Act of Aug. 6, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-74, 89 Stat. 400 (1975).
63
s. REP. No. 94-295, at 8-9 (1975).
64
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). The Court did strike down one provision
in the 1970 extension, namely, Congress's effort to lower the voting age to 18 in state and
local elections. Three Justices would have struck down the provision's application to federal
elections as well. Id. at 281 (Stewart, J., dissenting in part).
65
400 U.S. at 133; id. at 234-35 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part); id. at 284 (Stewart,
J., dissenting in part).
66
446 U.S. 156, 173 (1980).
67
446 U.S. 55, 67-68, 80 (1980).
61

62
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nevertheless proscribe implementation of electoral changes in covered
jurisdictions that were discriminatory solely in effect. Citing South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Court noted that such state action, while
constitutional, may "perpetuate[] the effects of past discrimination," and
"create the risk of purposeful discrimination" in covered jurisdictions.
Three Justices disagreed, claiming the VRA was unconstitutional under
this approach. 68
Congress responded to both City of Rome and Mobile v. Bolden when
it again reauthorized the VRA in 1982. The new amendments extended
the preclearance regime for an additional twenty-five years in the regions
where it applied without updating the coverage formula. The 1982
amendments also expanded opportunities for covered jurisdictions to
''bailout" from the preclearance requirements. Most notably, the 1982
amendments amended Section 2 of the VRA to proscribe any voting
practice that "results in a denial or abridgement" of the right to vote based
on race or membership in designated language minority communities.
Rather than a pure disparate impact test, the new provision mandated a
complex inquiry derived from foundational cases defining racial vote
dilution in which many factors are relevant, and none dispositive. 69
As a result of these amendments and the Supreme Court's
construction of them, 70 new districting plans began including a larger
proportion of districts in which minority voters constituted a majority
than they once had. Voters in these districts largely, albeit not
exclusively, elected minority candidates to office. By the mid-1990s, more
minority representatives were serving on school boards, city councils,
state legislatures, and in the U.S. House of Representatives than at any
time since Reconstruction. 71
The Supreme Court soon became uneasy about the proliferation of
majority-minority districts and the type of political participation the
Court thought they fostered. In a number of cases, the Court read the
VRA narrowly, thereby limiting the instances in which liability might
arise and a new majority-minority district might be required. 72 The Court
Id. at 177.
42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2000). See also White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973);
Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (1973).
70
Thornburg v. Gingles, 4 78 U.S. 30 (1987), invited the creation of majority-minority
districts both to remedy and to avoid Section 2 violations. For more on this case, see Dan
Tokaji's chapter in this book. The decision also prompted covered jurisdictions to include
more majority-minority districts in proposed districting plans than they had previously
because compliance with Section 5 of the VRA was understood to require compliance with
Section 2 (at least until the Court ruled otherwise in 1997), see Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch.
Bd., 520 U.S. 471,476 (1997); 28 C.F.R. § 51.55(b)(2) (1996), modified by 28 C.F.R. § 51.55(b)
(2012), and because the Department of Justice repeatedly denied preclearance to
redistricting plans the agency thought contained too few majority-minority districts. See
Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996): Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
71
See Richard H. Pildes, The Politics of Race: Quiet Revolution in the South, 108
HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1364-65 & n.31 (1995) (book review).
72
See, e.g., Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003); Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd.,
528 U.S. 320 (2000); Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 531 U.S. 471 (1997); Abrams v.
68

69
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also blunted the incentive to draw majority-minority districts
prophylactically to avoid liability under the VRA. Shaw u. Reno and its
progeny recognized a new "analytically distinct" injury under the Equal
Protection Clause that arose when jurisdictions created oddly shaped
majority-minority districts that were not absolutely required by the
VRA. 73 Taken together, these decisions scaled back the VRA's reach and
reduced opportunities to employ its dominant remedy.
Curiously, the biggest challenge to the VRA came not from these
decisions, but from a separate case that did not directly involve voting
rights. Decided in 1997, City of Boerne u. Flores 74 struck down the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which Congress enacted to
restore, via statute, a test for unconstitutional religious discrimination
that the Justices had rejected in 1990. 75 In so doing, RFRA outlawed a
good deal of conduct that would have survived constitutional review
under the Court's post-1990 test.

City of Boerne held that RFRA was not appropriate enforcement
legislation. The Court found that the constitutional violations Congress
documented in the supporting record (and had ostensibly crafted RFRA
to address) were too few in number and lacked sufficient connection to
the obligations the statute imposed on state and local governments
throughout the nation. RFRA accordingly lacked "congruence and
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the
means adopted to that end." 76 The Court saw RFRA as an attempt by
Congress to declare the content of constitutional rights themselves rather
than to enforce constitutional rights as defined by the Court. City of
Boerne held that Congress lacked this power.
By 2001, the Court invalidated five more federal statutes under the
"congruence and proportionality" standard. 77 Applying rigorous review,
the Court deemed linkages between statutory proscriptions and
constitutional injuries too attenuated, statutory remedies too broad, and
underlying congressional findings too skimpy to render various statutory
provisions valid exercises of Congress's enforcement power. Boerne and
its progeny made clear valid enforcement legislation needed to rest on a
record documenting a widespread pattern of unconstitutional conduct

Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994); Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512
U.S. 997, 1022 (1994); Presley v. Etowah Cnty. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 491 (1992).
73
See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 652 (1993); see also Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S.
852 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
74
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
75
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
76
City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
77
Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 370 (2001); Kimel v. Fla.
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 90 (2000); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 625-26
(2000); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666
(1999); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 63941 (1999).
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and that neither general assertions nor isolated examples of
unconstitutional conduct sufficed. 78
The rigorous review employed under Boerne and its progeny differed
from the more deferential approach the Court had taken earlier in the
VRA cases from South Carolina v. Katzenbach through City of Rome.
These earlier cases all deferred to Congress's judgments regarding the
need for particular remedies, including ones that intruded deeply into
state and local decision-making to prohibit conduct the Constitution
permits. And yet, the Boerne cases did not purport to overrule the VRA
precedent. Instead, they explicitly preserved it. 79 Boerne cited and
discussed the provisions upheld in the early VRA cases as examples of
permissible enforcement legislation, despite both "the burden those
measures placed on the States" and their proscription of constitutional
conduct. 80 Boerne's progeny likewise invoked the earlier VRA provisions
as examples of permissible congressional action, and cited the decisions
upholding them as so establishing. 81
The Boerne decisions, however, never provided a precise formulation
or test by which to distinguish the statutory provisions the earlier VRA
decisions upheld from those the Court had now struck down. Boerne itself
observed that, unlike RFRA, the VRA's preclearance regime was a timelimited measure, restricted in its geographic reach, and developed to
address a lengthy record that documented widespread and egregious
constitutional violations. And yet, Boerne also insisted that none of these
elements was essential, noting explicitly "[t]his is not to say, of course,
that § 5 legislation requires termination dates, geographic restrictions or
egregious predicates." 82
The Court, moreover, did not explain why it accorded so much
deference to Congress in the early VRA cases and so little in the Boerne
decisions. 83 The Court was, no doubt, reluctant to overturn the salient
VRA precedent, 84 but it did more than simply preserve those cases. Just
three years after City of Boerne, the Justices extended the deferential
stance espoused in those early decisions and again upheld the
constitutionality of the preclearance regime. Lopez v. Monterey County
affirmed Congress's power "to guard against changes that give rise to a
78

See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91; Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 640; Boerne, 521 U.S. at

526, 531.
79
Boerne rejects Katzenbach u. Morgan's suggestion that Congress may "ratchet up"
constitutional protections as construed by the Court. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 527-58;
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1966) (holding that Congress's Section 5
power is limited to remedying violations of constitutional rights as defined by the Court).
80
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518.
81
See Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 735-36 (2003); Garrett, 531
U.S. at 373; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 89; Coll. Sau. Bank, 527 U.S. at
639 n.5.
82
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533.
83
Katz, supra note 21, at 2367-2368.
84
See Pamela S. Karlan, Easing the Spring: Strict Scrutiny and Affirmative Action
After the Redistricting Cases, 43 WM. & MARYL. REV. 1569, 1594 (2002).
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discriminatory effect" in covered jurisdictions, and emphasized that the
Fifteenth Amendment permits "this intrusion" into state sovereignty.
Justice Thomas dissented alone, citing City of Boerne. 85

III. The Shelby County Problem
Absent congressional action, the preclearance regime would have
ended in 2007 pursuant to the terms of the 1982 Reauthorization. In
2006, however, Congress voted overwhelmingly in support of the Fannie
Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006 ("the 2006
Reauthorization"). Before doing so, it held hearings and debates shaped
not only by political and policy concerns but by the certainty that a
reauthorized statute would be challenged as exceeding Congress's
enforcement powers under the City of Boerne doctrine.
The challenge was expected because opportunities for minority
political participation in covered jurisdictions had undeniably improved
since Congress first crafted the statute. The 2006 reauthorization process
accordingly presented Congress with the question whether the problems
that persisted rose to the level Boerne and its progeny demanded, 86
assuming that courts reviewing preclearance as reauthorized would
apply the Boerne standard. This question became the one Shelby County
v. Holder presented.
The Shelby County problem was new. Unlike the statutes
invalidated in the Boerne cases, the VRA was not a new statute. It had
been operating for many years. This meant that conditions in the places
where the VRA's reauthorized preclearance regime applied were already
regulated and thus needed to be evaluated in light of the regime's ongoing
operational effect. More specifically, that evaluation needed to determine
whether observable improvements signaled a problem solved or, instead,
a problem kept in check by the very regulatory measures in place. 87
Some observers believed the problem had been solved. They argued
that the type of discrimination that the preclearance regime was designed
to address was no longer prevalent in covered jurisdictions, that any
discrimination that persisted was no longer distinct from the
discrimination that occurred elsewhere, and that the VRA's selective
geographic reach was producing perverse effects. 88 Others called on
525 U.S. 266, 283-285 (1999); id. at 294-97 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
See Complaint, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d
221 (D.D.C. 2008) (No. 06-cv-1384) (filed August 4, 2006).
87
Ellen D. Katz, Dismissing Deterrence, 127 HARV. L. REV. F., 248 (2014).
88
See, e.g., Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006 (Part I): Hearing on H.R. 9 Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 13-37 (2006)
(testimony of Roger Clegg); Voting Rights Act: Section 5 of the Act-History, Scope, and
Purpose: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. 15, 14-15 (2005) (statement of Edward J. Blum); Understanding the Benefits
and Costs of Section 5 Pre-clearance: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 8 (2006) (statement of Abigail Thernstrom).
85
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Congress to make significant modifications to the VRA to addresses the
legal, political, and social changes that had occurred since the regime was first
crafted. 89

Still, the record Congress assembled in advance of reauthorization
provided evidence showing both that preclearance continued to play a
critical role in covered jurisdictions, and that the discrimination that
persisted in these regions remained distinct. The 15,000 page record
produced after 21 congressional hearings included testimony from dozens
of witnesses and numerous reports evaluating conditions for minority
political participation both in covered jurisdictions and nationwide. The
record documented significant increases in minority voter registration
and turnout, and in the number of elected minority officials in covered
jurisdictions. 90 But it also provided substantial evidence showing the
persistence of significant obstacles to minority political participation in
these regions and the role of the preclearance regime in keeping these
obstacles in check.
More specifically, the record documented repeated instances of
intentional racial discrimination directed at minority voters in covered
jurisdictions, including events in which overt hostility to minority voting
power was evident; the persistence of significant and indeed extreme
racial bloc voting in these regions; the recurring failure of many covered
jurisdictions to submit required electoral changes for preclearance and
105 successful Section 5 enforcement actions brought against covered
jurisdictions that attempted to implement unprecleared changes; more
than 700 federal objections raised to proposed electoral changes since
1982, the majority of which were based on evidence of intentional
discrimination; and more than 800 proposed electoral changes that
covered jurisdictions withdrew or modified after the Department of
Justice attorneys requested more information about their purpose and
effect; 622 instances in which federal observers were sent to covered
jurisdictions to address concerns about constitutional violations; and 25
unsuccessful judicial preclearance actions by covered jurisdictions. 91
89
See, e.g., The Continuing Need for Section 5 Pre-clearance: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 206 (2006) (statement of Richard H. Pildes); An
Introduction to the Expiring Provisions of the Voting Rights Act and Legal Issues Relating
to Reauthorization, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 206 (May 9,
2006) (statement and responses of Richard L. Hasen), at 34-38; Heather K. Gerken, A Third
Way: Section 5 and the Opt-In Approach, in THE FUTURE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT (David
L. Epstein, Richard H Pildes, et al., eds., 2006) at 277-280, 297-98; Daniel P. Tokaji, If It's
Broke, Fix It: Improving Voting Rights Act Preclearance, 49 How. L.J. 785, 830-41 (2006).
90
See H.R. Rep. 109-478, at 5, 11-12; S. Rep. 109-295, at 2-4, 15. The record
arguably overstated this progress, given that, as Nate Persily has shown, both the House
and Senate reports counted Hispanic voters as white when comparing black and white
turnout; doing so yielded white turnout data that "appeared artificially low and in some
states [made] black turnout appear to be a few percentage points higher than white
turnout." See Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117
YALE L.J. 174, 197 (2007).
91
See S. Rep. No. 109-295, at 11, 13-14; H.R. Rep. No. 109-478, at 21, 22, 24, 3637, 39, 40-41, 44, 67; Voting Rights Act: Evidence of Continued Need: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 141-43, 172,
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The record also contained evidence that compared conditions for
minority political participation in covered jurisdictions with the
conditions in non-covered regions. A study ofVRA Section 2 litigation we
conducted at the University of Michigan Law School showed that covered
jurisdictions accounted for 56 percent of all successful cases brought
under Section 2 since 1982, even though they contained 25 percent of the
nation's population, and were subject to the preclearance requirement,
which itself already reduced the need for Section 2 litigation in these
regions. 92 The study, which courts and litigators have referred to as "the
Katz study," provided the only systematic comparative evidence on
covered versus non -covered jurisdictions in the congressional record, and
as such, figured prominently in the subsequent litigation.
After hearing from witnesses and compiling a lengthy legislative
record, Congress voted to reauthorize the preclearance regime. It neither
added nor removed jurisdictions from coverage and instead maintained
the statute's existing geographic reach by preserving the Section 4(b)
formula it last amended in 1975. The 2006 Reauthorization also declined
to ease bailout by eligible jurisdictions, despite several proposals that
urged such action for reasons of policy and constitutional compliance. 93
The few substantive changes Congress made restored the VRA to operate
as it had before the Court adopted narrowing constructions in decisions
from the early 2000s. 94
The House passed the 2006 reauthorization by a large margin; the
vote in the Senate was unanimous, 95 although the Republican members
of the Senate Judiciary Committee subsequently issued a report that
called the constitutionality of the reauthorized statute into question. 96
President George W. Bush signed the bill into law on July 27, 2006, at a
Rose Garden ceremony in which he described the 2006 Reauthorization
as "an example of our continued commitment to a united America where
every person is valued and treated with dignity and respect." The

176, 177- 178, 180-82, 185-86, 208, 250, 251, 275, 2553, 2565 (2006); Voting Rights Act:
Section 5 of the Act-History, Scope, and Purpose: Hearing Before Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the House Judiciary Comm., 109th Cong. 830-31 (2006).
92
See Ellen D. Katz, with Margaret Aisenbrey, Anna Baldwin, Emma Cheuse, and
Anna Weisbrodt, Documenting Discrimination: Judicial Findings Under Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act Since 1982, Final Report of the Voting Rights Initiative, at http://
sitemaker.umich.edu/votingrights/home (2005), reprinted in To Examine The Impact and
Effectiveness of the Voting Rights Act: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution
of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (Oct. 18, 2005) (appendix pp. 9641124). Reprinted as revised in 39 MICH. J. L. REFORM 643-772 (2006).
93
See 152 Cong. Rec. H5198 (Westmoreland amendment); Rick Hasen, Drafting a
Proactive Bailout Measure for VRA Reauthorization, ELECTION LAW BLOG (May 18, 2006
09:37 AM), http://electionlawblog.org/archives/005655.html.
94
See Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, § 2(b)(6), 120 Stat. 577,
578 (2006) (overturning Georgia v. Ashcroft and Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd).
95
152 Cong. Rec. H5207 (July 13, 2006).
96
See Shelby County, Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2635 (2013). See generally S.
Rep. No. 109-295 (2006); Persily, supra note 90, at 180-197.

ELLEN D. KATZ

521

president pledged that his administration would "vigorously enforce the
provisions of this law, and we will defend it in court." 97
As expected, a Boerne-based challenge to the 2006 reauthorization
came within days of its enactment. On August 4, 2006, a small utility
district in Texas filed suit, alleging that Congress lacked the authority to
reauthorize the VRA on the terms that it did. Edward Blum, head of an
organization called the Project for Fair Representation, and Gregory
Coleman, a prominent appellate attorney, led the challenge. Blum was a
longstanding opponent of race-based decision-making, having supported
litigation that challenged districting plans and admission practices said
to have impermissibly employed race-based criteria. 98 Coleman, who
served as Texas Solicitor General from 1999 to 2001, would argue the case
in the Supreme Court.
The plaintiff selected was the Northwest Austin Municipal Utility
District No. 1, also known as the "NAMUDNO." The district was created
in 1987 to provide wastewater and other services to a growing residential
subdivision in Travis County, Texas. Directed by a five-member
governing board elected to staggered four-year terms, the utility district
was a covered jurisdiction under the VRA because it was located within
a covered jurisdiction. The state of Texas became covered jurisdiction in
1975, well before the NAMUDNO was created.
The utility district was an attractive plaintiff because there was no
evidence suggesting the district had ever engaged in racial discrimination
or that it had otherwise failed to comply with the VRA. Its clean record
notwithstanding, the district needed to seek and obtain federal approval
before making electoral changes, as it had done back in 2004 when it
wanted to move its polling place from a private home to a school and
thereby make voter participation easier.

In its August 2006 complaint, the utility district raised two claims.
First, it sought relief under the VRA's Section 4(a). This ''bailout"
provision allowed jurisdictions that had clean records and met other
specified criteria to petition for release from coverage and the
preclearance requirement. By its terms, the VRA seemed to limit bailout
to States and "political subdivisions" that conduct voter registration, and
while the NAMUDNO was neither, it claimed eligibility for bailout based
on its status as a political subdivision understood more colloquially,
namely, as a division of local government. 99
The utility district also sought a ruling that the preclearance
obligation was unconstitutional. Presenting the Shelby County problem
152 Cong. Rec. S8781 (Aug. 3, 2006).
See Morgan Smith, One Man Standing Against Race-Based Laws, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 24, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/24/us/edward-blum-and-the-project-onfair-representation-head-to-the-supreme-court-to-fight-race-based-la ws.html.
99
First Amended Complaint, Nw. Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Gonzales,
No. 1:06-cv-01384, D.D.C., filed Mar. 22, 2007, at 4-5; see also Complaint, Nw. Austin
Municipal Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Gonzales, No. l:10-cv-00651, D.D.C., filed Aug. 4, 2006.
97
98
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for the first time, the NAMUDNO maintained that conditions for political
participation in covered jurisdictions had improved so significantly since
Congress first enacted the VRA that maintaining the preclearance
obligation could no longer be justified. Congress's decision to continue
coverage based on the existing formula was "arbitrary and irrational" and
"no longer a 'congruent and proportional' remedial exercise of Congress's
enforcement power." 100
A three-judge panel of the Federal District Court for the District of
Columbia disagreed. Writing for the panel, Judge David Tatel explained
that the utility district was ineligible for bailout because it was not a
governmental unit that registered voters, as the VRA required. The
district court further held that the 2006 Reauthorization of the VRA was
a constitutional exercise of congressional power. Judge Tatel wrote that
the constitutional question presented should be evaluated under the
rationality standard from South Carolina v. Katzenbach, and the greater
degree of deference that standard accorded Congress, because the 2006
Reauthorization involved Congress's power to remedy racial
discrimination in voting under the Fifteenth Amendment. The district
court nevertheless held that the reauthorized VRA also passed muster
under City of Boerne's stricter congruence and proportionality test. The
court found that Congress documented sufficient evidence of
contemporary discrimination in covered jurisdictions to make the
reauthorized regime an appropriately tailored remedy. 101
In particular, the opinion observed that racial disparities remained
in voter participation rates and the number of minority officials elected
in covered jurisdictions. It also noted the number of Attorney General
objections to proposed electoral changes; changes withdrawn after DOJ
requests for more information; judicial preclearance suits; Section 5
enforcement suits; the scope of racially polarized voting; and the scores of
examples of intentional racial discrimination in covered jurisdictions. 102
The court also relied extensively on the Section 2 study and cited it for
the evidence of intentional racial discrimination that it documented, and
for its showing that racial discrimination in voting persisted in covered
jurisdictions at a higher rate than in non-covered jurisdictions despite
preclearance provision's deterrent effects. 10a
The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and set the case for
argument. There was good reason to think the Justices would be more
receptive to the NAMUDNO's constitutional claim than the district court
had been. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito had recently replaced
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor, respectively. These new
Justices seemed less inclined to support the VRA than their predecessors,

° First Amended Complaint, supra note 99, at 5---8.

10

101

Nw. Austin Mun. Utility Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, 573 F.Supp.2d 221, 231-235,
245---246, 268-276 (D.D.C. 2009).
102 Id. at 247-257, 263-264.
10a Id. at 258-261, 276-277.
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who themselves had already viewed the statute with considerable
skepticism and only qualified support. 104
For instance, weeks before the 2006 reauthorization became law, the
new Chief Justice had reacted to a redistricting plan imposed as the
consequence of the VRA with the observation, "it is a sordid business, this
divvying us by race." 105 Chief Justice Roberts's discomfort with the VRA
stemmed not only from a considered distaste for majority-minority
districts, but also from a less contextual and more categorical objection to
race-conscious decision-making. While the Rehnquist Court had
previously tolerated a good deal of such decision-making, 106 the new
Roberts Court seemed more inclined to limit or dislodge mandates to
consider race. As Chief Justice Roberts notably said, "The way to stop
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis
of race." 107
The Roberts Court, moreover, would couple its commitment to
colorblindness with a preference for applying the Boerne doctrine
rigorously. In decisions issued in 2003 and 2004, the Rehnquist Court had
tempered Boerne and upheld statutes that would have fallen under the
doctrine as originally employed. 108 The Roberts Court would come to favor
the more demanding approach. 109 This inclination, in turn, rendered the
Boerne-based constitutional challenge to the 2006 VRA reauthorization
even more serious.
Oral argument in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District
Number One v. Holder was held on April 29, 2009. A number of the
Justices expressed considerable skepticism about the continued need for
the VRA. Chief Justice Roberts colorfully equated the regime to an
"elephant whistle," shooing away a nonexistent threat. 110 He also
suggested that the 2006 Reauthorization was premised impermissibly on
the idea that "southerners are more likely to discriminate than
northerners." 111 Justice Kennedy seemed particularly troubled that
reauthorization might represent Congress's judgment "that the
sovereignty of Georgia is less than the sovereign dignity of Ohio ... [that]
104 Compare, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 596 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring)
with Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 972, 990 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
105 League of United Latin American Citizens [LULAC] v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 511
(2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring). For more on this case, see Justin Levitt's chapter in this
book.
106 See, e.g., Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900
(1995). See also Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging
Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1292-93 (2011).
107 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748

(2007).
108 See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004); Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs,
538 U.S. 721, 727-35 (2003).
109 See Coleman v. Ct. of Apps. of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327, 1333-34 (2012).
no See Transcript of Oral Argument at 28, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v.
Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009) (No. 08-322).
111 See id. at 48.
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the governments in one are to be trusted less than the governments than
the other." 112 And Justice Scalia suggested that the widespread support
for reauthorization in Congress weighed against the measure's validity,
noting "everybody who voted for ... this system was elected under this
system." Justice Scalia questioned, "do you ever seriously expect
Congress to vote against a reextension of the Voting Rights Act? Do you
really think that any incumbent would-would vote to do that?"H 3
On June 22, 2009, the Court reversed the district court and
remanded the case. Surprisingly, NAMUDNO did not resolve the
constitutional question the case presented, and instead, the Justices
ruled unanimously that the utility district was entitled to seek bailout.
Chief Justice Roberts's opinion explained that the VRA "must" be
interpreted to allow all political subdivisions to pursue bailout, regardless
of whether or not they conduct voter registration. Dismissing the contrary
statutory definition, the Chief Justice wrote that precedent, statutory
structure, and underlying constitutional concerns all dictated a broader
reading of the term "political subdivision."ll4
This statutory ruling meant that the Court did not need to resolve
the constitutional issue presented. Justice Thomas alone would have
resolved that question and wrote that he would have held the
preclearance requirement unconstitutional.H 5 Chief Justice Roberts's
opinion nevertheless offered a number of thoughts on the question the
Court refused to resolve.
"Things have changed in the South," the opinion stated, and while
"[i]t may be ... that conditions continue to warrant preclearance," the
VRA, as reauthorized "imposes current burdens and must be justified by
current needs." The opinion, moreover, stated that preclearance
"differentiates between the States despite our historic tradition that all
the States enjoy 'equal sovereignty.'" Acknowledging that South
Carolina v. Katzenbach had expressly rejected the idea that the
preclearance regime violated this principle, the Court in NAMUDNO
insisted that "a departure from the fundamental principle of equal
sovereignty requires a showing that a statute's disparate geographic
coverage is sufficiently related to the problem that it targets."H 6
On this point, the Chief Justice's opinion expressed considerable
doubt. It suggested that the "evil that § 5 is meant to address may no
longer be concentrated in the jurisdictions singled out for preclearance,"
and that "there is considerable evidence that [the coverage formula] fails
to account for current political conditions." The opinion stated that "[t]he
Act's preclearance requirements and its coverage formula raise serious
112
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constitutional questions" whether reviewed under the congruence and
proportionality standard or the more lenient rational basis test. 117
The NAMUDNO ruling was met with considerable surprise,
particularly since the tenor of oral argument led many to expect a ruling
striking down the statutory regime. Some observers praised the Court for
its restraint, describing its refusal to resolve the constitutional issue as
"a powerful statement" and "the biggest act of statesmanship of the
Roberts court." 118 Others were less sanguine. The statutory ruling looked
like the avoidance tactic it was, and was difficult to read as a credible act
of statutory construction. Meanwhile, NAMUDNO's deep skepticism
about the continued validity of the VRA, while technically dicta,
portended the statute's demise. 119 NAMUDNO had preserved the VRA
with an improbable statutory construction, but also it made clear that the
Court stood ready to scrap the statute in the next case unless something
significant changed. 120
The next case was Shelby County v. Holder.

IV. The Shelby County Litigation

NAMUDNO's skepticism about the VRA's preclearance regime
invited a subsequent challenge to the statute. Ed Blum of the Project for
Fair Representation again led the effort, this time working with Alabama
attorney Frank C. Ellis and attorneys Bruce Rein, William Consovoy, and
Thomas R. McCarthy of Wiley Rein, LLP, in Washington, D.C.
Blum identified Shelby County, Alabama, as a promising plaintiff
precisely because it lacked the clean record that once made the
NAMUDNO seem so attractive. Shelby County had been a covered
jurisdiction since the original 1965 VRA covered the State of Alabama.
The County was facially ineligible for bailout because of spotty VRA
compliance, including its repeated failure both to submit electoral
changes prior to implementation and to secure preclearance for the
changes it submitted. 1 21
Most recent was the Department of Justice's August 25, 2008,
refusal to approve an annexation proposal for the City of Calera in Shelby
County. The objection was based on evidence that this annexation would
reduce African-American voting strength, and on the fact that the County
provided demographic data that was "unreliable." 122 The City of Calera
m Id. at 203
See Adam Liptak, Justices Retain Oversight by U.S. on Voting, N.Y. TIMES (Jun.
22, 2009), at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/23/us/23scotus.htm1.
119 See Richard L. Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance by the
Roberts Court, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 281; Ellen D. Katz, From Bush v. Gore to NAMUDNO: A
Response to Professor Amar, 61 FLA. L. REV. 991, 993 (2009).
12° See Katz, supra note 119, at 998.
121 See Ari Berman, Why Are Conservatives Trying to Destroy the Voting Rights Act?,
THE NATION (Feb. 6, 2013).
122 Letter, Grace Chung Becker, Acting Assistant Attorney General to Dan Head,
Wallace, Ellis, Fowler & Head, Aug. 28, 2008 (objecting to proposed annexations).
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responded by going ahead with an election run under the unapproved
plan in August 2008, and then holding a run-off election in October 2008,
in which Ernest Montgomery, the sole African-American member of the
Calera City Council, was defeated. The Justice Department responded
with a Section 5 enforcement action, which was resolved through a
consent decree.
A.

Shelby County v. Holder in the Lower Courts

On April 27, 2010, Shelby County filed suit seeking a declaratory
judgment that the 2006 Reauthorization of Sections 4(b) and 5 of the VRA
were facially unconstitutional and a permanent injunction barring their
enforcement. The complaint did not seek bailout, stating that it "would
be futile" given that the County "is ineligible for bailout under the terms
of the statute." Instead, Shelby County argued that Congress lacked
authority under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to
reauthorize the statute based on the record it assembled, and that the
reauthorized provisions intruded into local autonomy in violation of the
Tenth Amendment and Article IV of the Constitution. 123
Shelby County's complaint charged that the legality of
reauthorization required a legislative record showing that covered
jurisdictions were "still engaged in the type of 'unremitting and ingenious
defiance' " of the Constitution that originally justified the enactment of
the VRA; that there was no evidence covered jurisdictions were engaging
in that type of discrimination; and that there was no reason think covered
jurisdictions would resurrect measures and practices of that sort should
the preclearance regime be eliminated. The complaint also argued that
the evidence of racial vote dilution and other so-called "secondgeneration" barriers could not support reauthorization because such
barriers "cannot be equated to the intentionally discriminatory practices
on which Congress relied" when it first enacted the VRA. 124
The complaint also charged that Congress's continued reliance on
the Section 4(b) formula exceeded Congress's enforcement powers. Shelby
County argued that Congress had insufficient evidence to single out
covered jurisdictions for special treatment, and that the differentiation
maintained among the states violated the tradition of "equal
sovereignty ."125
The district court rejected Shelby County's claims. Federal District
Judge John D. Bates evaluated the 2006 Reauthorization under City of
Boerne's congruence and proportionality standard, which, he wrote, had
"explicated and refined the one standard of review that has always been
employed to assess legislation enacted pursuant to both the Fourteenth

123 Complaint, Shelby County, Ala. v. Holder, No. 1:10-cv-00651, D.D.C., filed Apr.
27, 2010, at 13, 17.
124 Id. at 16, 17, 18.
125 Id. at 18---20.
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that the 2006

Judge Bates examined the congressional record supporting
reauthorization in detail. He noted that it documented persisting racial
disparities in voter registration, turnout, and minority electoral success,
particularly to statewide offices, in covered jurisdictions; the number and
type of Section 5 objections interposed and the responses of covered
jurisdictions to DOJ "more information" requests; the number of
unsuccessful actions seeking judicial preclearance; the number and
nature of successful enforcement actions against covered jurisdictions
that failed to preclear proposed voting changes; the use of federal
observers to monitor elections; evidence of prevalent racially-polarized
voting; and evidence that the VRA was deterring voting discrimination in
covered jurisdictions. 127 Judge Bates also relied extensively on our study
documenting relative rates of successful litigation under the VRA's
Section 2 in covered and non-covered jurisdictions as supporting the
validity of the coverage formula.12s
Finally, Judge Bates rejected the County's claim that the Section
4(b) coverage formula was not "sufficiently related" to the problems
preclearance targeted. Judge Bates noted that Congress opted to
maintain the existing 4(b) formula and the coverage it generated only
after it assembled a record that documented voting discrimination had
"persisted" in covered jurisdictions and "remained more prevalent" in
them than in places not subject to the preclearance requirement. That
the Section 4(b) "triggers" rested on old turnout data was immaterial,
Judge Bates wrote, given that the triggers were simply "proxies for
identifying those jurisdictions with established histories of
discriminating against racial and language minority voters." The passage
of time did not alter the fact that "discrimination in voting remained a
serious problem in covered jurisdictions" and hence cause for Congress to
continue the regime.129
On May 18, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
affirmed in a divided decision. Writing for himself and Judge Thomas B.
Griffith, Judge Tatel held that the validity of the 2006 Reauthorization
rested on "whether Congress has documented sufficiently widespread and
persistent racial discrimination in voting in covered jurisdictions to
justify its conclusion" that preclearance remained necessary. In finding
that it did, the court rejected Shelby County's claim that contemporary
discrimination needed to rise to the magnitude observed in 1965. The
court also dismissed the argument that its review was limited to the
obstacles individual voters confront when registering and casting a ballot.
Judge Tatel wrote that conduct involving intentional racial vote dilution,
12s

Shelby County v. Holder, 811 F. Supp. 2d 424, 449, 465, 492-503 (D.D.C. 2011).
Id. at 466-492.
12 s Id. at 465, 481-482, 483-484, 506.
129 Id. at 503-507.
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and related "second generation" issues, was also relevant both because it
violates the Fourteenth Amendment and because "tactics like intentional
vote dilution are in fact decades-old forms of gamesmanship" that were
"well known" to Congress in 1965 and in 2006. 130
Like the district court, the appellate court examined the
congressional record supporting the 2006 Reauthorization in detail.
Judge Tatel's opinion cited numerous instances of overt discrimination,
the hundreds of DOJ objections interposed, the impact of more
information requests, the use of federal observers, successful Section 5
enforcement actions blocking implementation of unprecleared changes,
and unsuccessful judicial preclearance actions brought by covered
jurisdictions. 131
The appellate court also emphasized the evidence before Congress
that compared discrimination in covered and non-covered jurisdictions.
Judge Tatel's opinion relied on the Section 2 study as "[t]he most concrete
evidence comparing covered and non-covered jurisdictions in the
legislative record," noting that "the Katz study . . . reached two key
findings suggesting racial discrimination in voting remains 'concentrated
in the jurisdictions singled out for preclearance.' "132 The opinion also
cited Peyton McCrary's analysis of unpublished Section 2 decisions,
which found that 81 percent of them originated in coveredjurisdictions. 133
Judge Tatel wrote that these results are "particularly dramatic given that
Attorney General objections block discriminatory laws before they can be
implemented and that Section 5 deters jurisdictions from even
attempting to enact such laws, thereby reducing the need for Section 2
litigation in covered jurisdictions." 134
Based on its review of the record, the appellate court concluded that
"overt racial discrimination persists in covered jurisdictions" and that
"section 5's 'current burdens' are indeed justified by 'current needs.' " 135
The court also upheld Congress's decision to maintain the Section 4(b)
coverage formula, finding that the statute as a whole, and particularly
with the bailout provisions as liberalized by NAMUDNO, "continues to
single out the jurisdictions in which discrimination is concentrated." 1 36
Judge Stephen Williams dissented, stating he would have struck
down the 4(b) coverage formula as irrational. Judge Williams posited that
for the statute to survive, conditions for minority political participation
in covered jurisdictions needed to be markedly worse than elsewhere, and
he concluded that the congressional record did not support such a
13 0

679 F.3d. 848, 864, 865 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
Id. at 865-873.
132 Id. at 874 (quoting NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 203).
133
Id. at 876. See also Deel. of Dr. Peyton McCrary, Shelby County, Ala. v. Holder,
D.D.C., No.l:10-cv-00651-JDB, filed Nov. 15, 2010, at 8-14.
134 679 F.3d at 869.
135 Id. at 873 (quoting NAMUDNO).
136 Id. at 883.
131
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finding. 137 Judge Williams found that the data from the Katz Study was
better understood once disaggregated by state, and he argued that such
disaggregation undermined the study's findings. Judge Williams also
disputed the coding of one case in the study .138
Shelby County filed a petition for certiorari, which the Supreme
Court granted on November 9, 2012.
B.

Shelby County v. Holder in the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court held oral argument in Shelby County u. Holder
on February 27, 2013. A good deal of the discussion echoed the argument
four years earlier in NAMUDNO, although a number of questions focused
more pointedly on Congress's decision to maintain without change the
regional differentiation the 4(b) formula produced, and the degree of
deference the Court should accord to that decision.
At the start, Justice Sonia Sotomayor questioned whether Shelby
County's poor record on voting rights made it "the wrong party bringing
this [challenge]." Justice Elena Kagan added, "Under any formula that
Congress could devise [for coverage under Section 5), it would capture
Alabama." Shelby County's attorney, Bert W. Rein, responded that the
challenge went to the validity of the 4(b) formula as enacted and not
whether a particular jurisdiction might be appropriately covered under
some other formula. rn9
Justice Kennedy expressed concern about Congress's decision to
maintain the 4(b) formula unchanged. He stated, "I don't know why under
the equal footing doctrine it would be proper to just single out States by
name, and if that, in effect, is what is being done, that seemed to me
equally improper." Later, Justice Kennedy observed, "if Congress is going
to single out separate States by name, it should do it by name. If not, it
should use criteria that are relevant to the existing [conditions]-and
Congress just didn't have the time or the energy to do this; it just
reenacted [the statute)." 140
Justice Scalia speculated that Congress would maintain the VRA in
its current form "in perpetuity unless-unless a court can say it does not
comport with the Constitution." Justice Scalia said that the unanimous
vote for reauthorization in the Senate was "very likely attributable, to a
phenomenon that is called perpetuation of racial entitlement ....
Whenever a society adopts racial entitlements, it is very difficult to get
out of them through the normal political processes." Justice Scalia also
stated that, ''You have to show, when you are treating different States
Id. at 884, 890-91 (Williams, J., dissenting).
Id. at 899. For a response to Judge Williams's aggregation argument, as well as
the coding and other methodological questions, see Brief of Ellen D. Katz and the Voting
Rights Initiative in Support of Respondents, Shelby County v. Holder, 116 S. Ct. 2612
(2013), No. 12-96, at 21-32.
139 Transcript of Oral Argument at 3-5, Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612
(2013) (No 12-96).
140 Id. at 21, 35.
137
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differently, that there's a good reason for it," and that "the crucial
question" was whether "there [is] some good reason for selecting these
nine [states]." 141
Chief Justice Roberts likewise queried whether "the differential
between covered and noncovered continues to be justified" and asked
whether the government's view was "that the citizens in the South are
more racist than citizens in the North[.]" 142 (On this point, Solicitor
General Don Verrilli responded that "it's not our submission" and instead
"that Congress had before it evidence that there was a continuing need
... [t]o maintain the deterrent and constraining effect of the Section 5
preclearance process in the covered jurisdictions.") 143
At the close of argument, Shelby County attorney Rein stated that
"it is up to the Court to determine whether the problem [to which the
Voting Rights Act was addressed] indeed has been solved." Justice Kagan
stated, "Well, that's a big, new power that you are giving us, that we have
the power now to decide whether racial discrimination has been solved? I
did not think that fell within our bailiwick. 144
Justice Breyer pointed out that, in his view, the "problem" the VRA
targeted was not only the discriminatory use of literacy tests and other
devices, but, more broadly, "the denial or abridgement by a State of the
right to vote on the basis of race and color ... and [that problem] certainly
is not solved." Justice Breyer asked Rein, in his view, how "do we decide
what was the problem that Congress was addressing in the Voting Rights
Act?" Rein answered that the VRA's coverage formula "responds to
limited registration and voting as measured and the use of devices. The
devices are gone. That problem has been resolved by the Congress
definitively." 145

Shelby County v. Holder issued four months later. Dividing 5-4, the
Court ruled that Section 4(b) was unconstitutional, and hence no longer
available as the basis for subjecting jurisdictions to preclearance. 146
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts posited that Section
4(b)'s singling out of some States but not others represented a "dramatic
departure from the principle that all States enjoy equal sovereignty."
While this "fundamental" principle did not always preclude the
differential treatment of States, it "remains highly pertinent" when
assessing such treatment. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, thus, upheld
the coverage formula despite the principle of equal sovereignty because,
at the time, "the means of linking the exercise of the unprecedented
authority with the problem that warranted it ... made sense." In 1965,
141
142
143

144
146
146

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 47, 59.
at 41-42, 62.
at 42.
at 66-67.
at 67-68.
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all covered jurisdictions had used tests and devices for voter registration,
and experienced a voting rate in the 1964 presidential election far below
the national average.147
"Nearly 50 years later, things have changed dramatically." The Chief
Justice wrote that the tests and devices that had triggered coverage had
long been outlawed, voter turnout and registration rates in covered
jurisdictions had risen dramatically, minority officials had been elected
to office, and overt discrimination was no longer commonplace. These
current conditions meant that a formula that had been "rational in both
practice and theory" in 1966, "raise[d] serious constitutional questions"
by 2009, and, by 2013, was no longer responsive to "current political
conditions." 148

In so holding, the Court dismissed the argument that conditions in
covered jurisdictions needed to be evaluated in light of the preclearance
regime's deterrent effect. Chief Justice Roberts rejected deterrence as a
"theory" under which preclearance "would be effectively immune from
scrutiny; no matter how 'clean' the record of covered jurisdictions, the
argument could always be made that it was deterrence that accounted for
the good behavior."149
The Chief Justice's opinion expressly dismissed the "thousands of
pages of evidence" Congress compiled to support the 2006
Reauthorization and the reach of the § 4(b) formula. The opinion found
the record to be insufficient. Part of the problem was that it failed to show
"anything approaching the 'pervasive,' 'flagrant,' 'widespread,' and
'rampant' discrimination that faced Congress in 1965." An even "more
fundamental problem" was Congress's failure to "use that record to
fashion a coverage formula grounded in current conditions," and its
insistence instead on "re-enact[ing] a formula based on 4O-year-old facts
having no logical relation to the present day." The majority also deemed
the record insufficient because much of the contemporary discrimination
it documented encompassed "second generation" conduct that differed
from the conduct Congress listed as criteria for coverage in the Section
4(b) formula. Chief Justice Roberts concluded, "We cannot pretend that
we are reviewing an updated statute ... [W]e are simply recognizing that
[the record] played no role in shaping the statutory formula before us
today." 150
Justice Thomas joined the majority opinion but wrote separately
because he would have struck down Section 5, along with Section 4(b),
and would have done so for the very reasons the majority gave for striking
down Section 4(b). Justice Thomas quoted repeatedly from the majority
14 7
148

Id. at 2618, 2623-2624, 2625.
Id. at 2625, 2626, 2627 (quoting Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308; NAMUDNO, 557
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opinion, which, he argued, "compellingly demonstrates" the invalidity of
Section 5 as well as Section 4(b). 151
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor,
dissented. Justice Ginsburg called the Court's decision to treat Shelby
County's challenge as a facial one "particularly inappropriate." In her
view, Shelby County's poor VRA record and Alabama's "sorry history" on
voting rights meant the statute, as applied to Shelby County, fell "well
within the bounds of Congress' legislative authority." Justice Ginsburg
also criticized the Court's invocation of the equal sovereignty principle,
arguing that South Carolina v. Katzenbach had, "in no uncertain terms,"
rejected the majority's understanding of that principle and that
NAMUDNO's dictum "didn't silently overrule" that holding. 152
Justice Ginsburg, however, devoted most of her dissent to a detailed
examination of the record Congress assembled to support the 2006
Reauthorization and her critique of the majority for "mak[ing] no genuine
attempt to engage" with that record. Justice Ginsburg described the
record as "massive" and "extraordinary" and argued that it contained
ample evidence to support Congress's judgment that preclearance was
still needed in the jurisdictions covered by Section 4(b). In her view, both
the Constitution itself and extensive precedent required the Court to
accord substantial deference to Congress's judgment. 153
Justice Ginsburg described the content of the record in detail,
cataloging the various types of evidence it documented. The Court erred,
she wrote, by focusing too narrowly on registration and turnout data,
which did not provide "the whole story," and had never described the full
range of conduct the VRA was designed to address. Instead, "[c]urrent
needs" in covered jurisdictions were better understood in light of the
scores of documented instances in which covered jurisdictions engaged in
intentional and, at times, overt racial discrimination in voting; the
hundreds of DOJ objections interposed to proposed electoral changes; the
hundreds more that were withdrawn after DOJ began investigating; the
Section 5 enforcement actions; and the scale of racially polarized voting
in covered jurisdictions.154
In support of Section 4(b)'s coverage formula, Justice Ginsburg found
that "even after 40 years and thousands of discriminatory changes
blocked by preclearance, conditions in the covered jurisdictions
demonstrated that the formula was still justified by 'current needs.' "155
Justice Ginsburg wrote that "Congress learned of these conditions
through ... the Katz study, [whose] comparison of§ 2 lawsuits in covered
and noncovered jurisdictions provides an appropriate yardstick for
Id.
Id.
15 s Id.
154 Id.
155 Id.
151
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measuring differences between covered and noncovered jurisdictions."
After discussing the study's data and results, Justice Ginsburg concluded:
"From these findings-ignored by the Court-Congress reasonably
concluded that the coverage formula continues to identify the
jurisdictions of greatest concern." 156
For Justice Ginsburg, the majority's decision to override Congress's
judgment amounted to "egregious" error. She noted that Congress had
devoted extensive time and effort to the reauthorization process and that
it opted to stay the course with a tested regime that had been shown to
deter and block discriminatory conduct in places where extensive
evidence demonstrated that problems persisted. On these grounds
Congress thought the regime's efficacy required its retention, making
"[h]ubris ... a fit word for [the majority's] demolition of the VRA." 157

V.

Voting Rights After Shelby County

Reactions to Shelby County v. Holder were strong and immediate.
Previously covered jurisdictions moved, some within hours of the
decision, to impose electoral restrictions that preclearance had, or would
have, blocked. 15 8 Some observers celebrated, commending the Court for
restoring "normalcy" to election law and curbing a regime they thought
had outlasted its purpose. 159 Others, however, condemned the ruling,
calling it "indefensible," "audacious," and an exercise in "false
humility ." 160
The criticism points to the many oddities in Chief Justice Roberts's
majority opinion. Confronted with a long-debated, Boerne-based
challenge to the preclearance regime, the Chief Justice's opinion
managed to resolve the case without mentioning either City of Boerne or
the appropriate standard of review. Challenged by Justice Thomas's
claim
that
the
majority's
analysis
rendered
preclearance
unconstitutional, the Court insisted that Section 5 remained available for
re-activation should Congress come up with a legal coverage formula.
Faced with South Carolina v. Katzenbach's explicit rejection of the equal
sovereignty principle, the Shelby County majority relied on equal
Id. at 2642-43.
Id. at 2648.
158 See, e.g., Michael Cooper, After Ruling, States Rush to Enact Voting Laws, N.Y.
TIMES (July 5, 2013), at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/06/us/politics/after-SupremeCourt-ruling-states-rush-to-enact-voting-laws.html.
159 See, e.g., Jackie Calmes et al,
On Voting Case, Reaction From 'Deeply
Disappointed' to
'It's About Time,' N.Y. TIMES (Jun.
25,
2013),
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/26/us/politics/on-voting-case-reaction-from-deeply-dis
appointed-to-its-about-time.html; Ilya Shapiro, Shelby County and the Vindication of
Martin Luther King's Dream, 8 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 182, 191-192 (2013}; William S.
Consovoy & Thomas R. McCarty, Shelby County v. Holder: The Restoration of
Constitutional Order, 2013 Cato SUP. CT. REV. 31 (2013}.
160 See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Shelby County and the fllusion of Minimalism, 22
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 713, 714 (2013); James Blacksher & Lani Guinier, Free At Last:
Rejecting Equal Sovereignty and Restoring the Constitutional Right to Vote, 8 HARV. L. &
POL'YREV. 39 (2014).
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sovereignty, treated dicta from NAMUDNO as a holding, and failed to
explain the reasons for its sub silentio repudiation of Katzenbach. 161
Most notable, however, was the Court's refusal to engage with the
extensive record in any serious detail. Instead, Chief Justice Roberts's
opinion maintained that the misconduct that the record documented and
that Justice Ginsburg catalogued was legally insufficient to justify
retention of the coverage formula. 162 But the opinion never adequately
explained why.
For instance, the fact that the documented misconduct did not rise
to the brazen defiance of constitutional norms that originally prompted
Congress to enact the VRA does not explain why the contemporary,
unconstitutional discrimination Justice Ginsburg described should not be
remedied in the manner Congress selected. South Carolina v. Katzenbach
and Katzenbach v. Morgan held that Congress had wide latitude when
crafting such remedies, and while City of Boerne v. Flores required a
tighter connection between remedies and unconstitutional conduct,
Boerne never suggested that ongoing constitutional violations should go
unremedied simply because past conditions were worse than
contemporary ones. 163 Shelby County, by contrast, seemed to limit
Congress's power to craft remedies for unconstitutional racial
discrimination simply because the discrimination fell short of the radical
type that defined Alabama in 1965.
So too, Shelby County never adequately explained why Congress
lacked power to maintain the Section 4(b) coverage formula. To be sure,
on a clean slate, a decision to regulate unregulated entities based on voter
participation decades ago would be difficult to defend. But Congress was
not starting from scratch in 2006. Instead, Congress confronted the
question of whether a lawfully imposed remedial regime should continue.
Shelby County deemed reauthorization irrational, but, standing alone,
the fact that Congress chose to continue the existing formula proves
nothing. Insofar as the Court thought there was a mismatch between
coverage and unconstitutional conduct, the Court needed to consider the
record on its merits and explain both where the record was deficient and
why the Court refused to grant Congress the deference long accorded in
this context. But the Court did neither.
The Court also provided inadequate explanation for its dismissal of
documented evidence of so-called "second-generation" barriers like racial
vote dilution. The Court insisted that Congress's failure to list such
barriers in Section 4(b) meant their persistence did not inform, much less
support, the continued need for the preclearance regime. But the coverage
formula's triggering criteria were never meant to define the statute's
reach. Instead, Congress designed the formula to capture places in which
161

See Hasen, supra note 160, at 733; Joseph Fishkin, The Dignity of the South, 123

YALE L.J. ONLINE 175 (2013), http://yalelawjournal.org/2013/06/08/fishkin.html.
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a broader range of conduct (including both registration barriers and long
experience with "second generation" conduct) had rendered the Fifteenth
Amendment a practical nullity. The Court itself had previously
recognized as much, 164 and Congress repeatedly extended the statute
with this understanding. Shelby County nevertheless insisted otherwise.
The Court changed the rules on Congress without explaining why.
Lastly, the Court too quickly dismissed the preclearance regime's
documented deterrent effect. Chief Justice Roberts was no doubt correct
that "good behavior" may often be attributed to deterrence and hence that
a deterrence-based "theory" threatens to immunize a regime from
scrutiny. 165 And yet, the deterrence generated by the preclearance regime
was not an unsubstantiated theory. As Justice Ginsburg's dissent
discussed, the record contained considerable evidence documenting the
ways in which the preclearance obligation repeatedly dissuaded covered
jurisdictions from proposing electoral changes that they knew would not
survive scrutiny. 166 The majority ignored this evidence without
explanation.
Amid the many oddities, and, indeed, failings in the majority's
opinion, the Court was clear that Congress lacked power to re-enact the
preclearance regime on the terms that it did. In so doing, the decision
offered only a partial answer to the Shelby County problem. 167 The Court
held that Congress lacked power to reauthorize the existing 4(b) formula
on the terms it did with the record it assembled, but left unresolved how
Congress might lawfully have extended the regime either in whole or in
part.
The Court's answer to the Shelby County problem places Congress
in an untenable position. Shelby County expressly invited responsive
action from Congress: "Congress may draft another formula based on
current conditions." 168 But that is easier said than done. Crafting a new
coverage formula is complicated because of the vast uncertainty Shelby
County created. The Court's refusal to examine the record in serious
detail, to discuss the appropriate standard of review, to grapple with
Justice Thomas's analysis of Section 5, to acknowledge, much less credit,
the regime's documented deterrent effect, and to accord Congress the
deference precedent seemed to demand all ensure serious legal challenges

Allen v. Ed. of Elections, 393 U.S. 554, 566-567 (1969).
133 S. Ct. at 2627; see also supra note 149 and accompanying text.
166 Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2639-40, 2641-2642 & nn. 4, 5 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
167 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
168 Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2631.
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with highly unpredictable results should Congress enact a new coverage
formula, 169 or otherwise modify existing voting rights legislation. 170

Shelby County is also likely to generate challenges to Section 2 of the
VRA, notwithstanding the majority's insistence that its holding "in no
way affects" that provision. 171 While Section 2 has been widely seen as an
incomplete substitute for the preclearance regime, 172 litigation under the
provision has expanded since Shelby County, 173 and proposals have been
offered to make Section 2 claims less burdensome to litigate. 174 Section 2,
however, has long been vulnerable to attack. It is susceptible to challenge
both as an impermissible exercise of congressional power under the City
of Boerne doctrine 175 and as an "effects" test for racial discrimination. 176
Growing reliance on Section 2 to address the regulatory gap Shelby
County created mcreases the prospect of these constitutional
challenges. 177
Shelby County fuels this prospect in an additional way. While the
ruling might have been (and perhaps still could be) limited to the unusual
features of the preclearance regime, the Shelby County litigation exposed
broader skepticism on the Court about the VRA itself. More specifically,
it revealed a developing belief among the Justices in the majority that the
VRA may be doing more harm than the discrimination it targets, and that
it has been placing a host of interested parties, including but not limited
to the victims of discrimination, in a decidedly better position than they
would have been had the discrimination never occurred. 178
169 See, e.g., S. 1659: Voting Rights Advancement Act of 2015, available at https://
www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/s1659; see also S. 1945, 113th Cong. (2014), available
at https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s1945/text, archived at http://perma.cc/K67TGT8A; see also Christopher S. Elmendorf & Douglas M. Spencer, The Geography of Racial
Stereotyping: Evidence and Implications for VRA Preclearance After Shelby County, 102
CAL. L. REV. 1123, 1139-56 (2014).
170 See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 160, at 714, 737-38; Samuel Issacharoff, Beyond the
Discrimination Model on Voting, 127 HARV. L. REV. 95, 96-97 (2013); Katz, supra note 87.
171 Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2631.
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(2014).
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This view of the VRA was manifest when Justice Scalia
characterized the statute as "a racial entitlement" at oral argument. It
also found expression in the majority opinion when Chief Justice Roberts
described a portion of the 2006 Reauthorization as "prohibit[ing] laws
that could have favored [minority voters] but did not do so because of a
discriminatory purpose." 179 The Chief Justice was referencing Congress's
rejection of a construction of the VRA the Court had adopted in 2000 in
Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board. 180 That case addressed a decision
by a covered jurisdiction to adopt a districting plan avowedly designed to
prevent the election of an African-American representative. 181 Shelby
County characterized this unconstitutional conduct as having blocked the
adoption of a plan "that could have favored" black voters. In other words,
the Shelby County majority posited that black voters would have been
"favored" under the rejected plan-and under what would have been the
VRA-mandated remedy-because that plan would have allowed for the
election of a black candidate, an occurrence that had not been possible
under prior districting plans in the jurisdiction. 182
Characterizing the opportunity to elect a minority candidate as
"favored" treatment expresses a discomfort with the VRA that extends
well beyond the geographic reach of the preclearance regime. Far more
broadly, it casts doubt on one of the regime's core substantive
commitments, which posits that members of racial minorities should
have the same opportunity to participate and elect representatives of
choice as do white voters. While the Court itself has long played a pivotal
role in shaping the contours of this commitment, Shelby County signals
an inclination to abandon that interpretive role and instead scrap the
project in its entirety. 183
For these reasons, Shelby County has fueled mounting sentiment
that voting rights, and perhaps civil rights more generally, might be
better protected by mechanisms less focused on racial discrimination.
Before Shelby County and increasingly in its wake, a number of
commentators have urged what my colleague Sam Bagenstos describes
as a "universalist" 184 approach to voting claims, namely, one that focuses
on the way a disputed regulation may burden the right to vote rather
than on the group or groups who are burdened by it. 185 Part of the claim
179
180
181
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See Katz, supra note 178.
Ellen D. Katz, A Cure Worse Than the Disease?, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 117 (2013),
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184 Samuel R. Bagenstos, Universalism and Civil Rights (with Notes on Voting Rights
After Shelby), 123 YALE L.J. 100, 102 (2014).
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538

SHELBY COUNTY V. HOLDER

is that a universalist approach better promotes core values and serves
more voters more effectively than conventional civil rights remedies
grounded in racial discrimination. 186 But strategic considerations also
loom large, with advocates of the position contending that there is far
greater political and judicial support for voting claims grounded in
universal terms than ones that devolve to the benefit of specific minority
groups.187
Without doubt, Shelby County provides strong support for this
sentiment. Guy-Uriel E. Charles and Luis Fuentes-Rohwer have recently
argued that the VRA once rested on a broad consensus about "the reality,
pervasiveness, and extent of racial discrimination by state actors in
democratic politics." Shelby County, they argue, shattered that consensus
and made clear that, "rightly or wrongly, the Court no longer believes
that intentional racial discrimination by state actors remains the
dominant problem of democratic politics." The ruling accordingly rejected
"the regulatory model that has undergirded modern voting rights policy
... because of what it views as the sufficient decline of intentional racial
discrimination by state actors."IBB

Shelby County identified this "sufficient decline" in intentional racial
discrimination without suggesting that such discrimination had been
eradicated. Put another way, the majority opinion seemed to recognize
that a great deal of discrimination, including intentional discrimination,
was still taking place in covered jurisdictions. The record documented
this discrimination and Justice Ginsburg described it in detail. This
discrimination, to be sure, fell short of the Jim Crow norm, but it was
discrimination nevertheless, and a good deal of it ran afoul of the
Constitution. Chief Justice Roberts never suggested otherwise and said
nothing that disputed Justice Ginsburg's description of the evidence. 189
Rather than contest the evidence of discrimination, the Chief Justice
dismissed it as insufficient to sustain the preclearance regime. Justice
760 (2006); Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the Voting
Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 689, 701 (2006); Daniel P. Tokaji, Responding to Shelby County:
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186 See, e.g., FISHKIN, supra note 185, at 249.
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others deemed judicially non-cognizable. See League of United Latin American Citizens
[LULAC] v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 511 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring); LULAC, 548 U.S. at
511-12 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 891-930, 944-46 (1994)
(Thomas, J., concurring). The majority may have also suspected that many of the examples
cited by Justice Ginsburg and collected in the congressional record sounded more in
discriminatory effect than intent or simply tracked a jurisdiction's inability to disprove
animus rather than its affirmative existence. But to the extent members of the majority
held such doubts, Chief Justice Roberts's opinion did not voice them.

539

ELLEN D. KATZ

Ginsburg analogized that move to the disposal of an umbrella in a storm
''because you are not getting wet." 190 Whether or not Chief Justice Roberts
and the other members of the Shelby County majority agreed, the ruling
makes clear they thought maintaining the preclearance regime, on the
terms it was reauthorized, did more harm than the discrimination it
addressed. To belabor Justice Ginsburg's analogy, the Shelby County
majority tossed out an umbrella in the middle of a rainstorm not because
it thought the rain had stopped, but because it thought carrying the
umbrella was more damaging than getting wet. 19 1
The Court's willingness to rule in this way documents the extent to
which the locus of voting rights jurisprudence has shifted. An "antidiscrimination consensus" once provided "the foundation upon which
modern voting rights law [was] built." 192 The target was intentional racial
discrimination in voting, and the record underlying the 2006
Reauthorization showed such discrimination continued in covered
jurisdictions. The Shelby County majority did not suggest otherwise,
holding instead that this level of unconstitutional discrimination no
longer warrants the foundational remedy Congress had crafted to address
it.

CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's most recent decision to address Congress's
power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment bears a striking resemblance
to its first. Separated by 137 years, United States v. Reese 193 and Shelby
County both struck down statutes Congress had crafted to enforce the
Fifteenth Amendment. Both did so based on controversial readings of the
statutes in question. Both dismissed undisputed evidence of
unconstitutional racial discrimination in voting. And both announced
relatively narrow holdings that ostensibly left room for Congress to
remedy the purported constitutional defect.
Congress took no action to remedy the defect that Reese identified.
In the years that followed, both Congress and the Court would recognize
racial discrimination in voting to be a pervasive problem that neither
institution had any interest in addressing. Both dismissed the remedies
for such discrimination as more costly and damaging than the
discrimination itself. 194 Eight decades would pass after Reese before
Congress again exercised its power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment,
and it was not until Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and
the Supreme Court endorsed it that meaningful access to the ballot began
to emerge for African-American voters in the South.
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Congress may yet act in response to Shelby County. The decision's
objections to the Section 4(b) formula may be opaque, but, on their face,
are far from insurmountable, and plausible responses have been
introduced. Still, just as Congress took no action after NAMUDNO, it may
lack the political will to move ahead now. And even if Congress proves
able to act, Shelby County's willingness to scrap the 4(b) formula in the
face of the record Congress assembled presents a serious challenge to any
new enforcement legislation. Shelby County makes clear that the Court
no longer identifies the intersection of racial discrimination and the right
to vote as a juncture in which Congress's judgments regarding remedies
warrant particular respect. The decision suggests that the Court instead
will review remedies for racial discrimination in voting with deep
skepticism. It signals the Court's suspicion that such remedies impose
unwarranted costs and that they may even do affirmative damage. In
short, Shelby County both captures and portends a willingness to tolerate
ongoing discrimination rather than embrace a strong remedy for it.

